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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FACULTY AND
STUDENTS: A PERSPECTIVE

77 In this case, the waiting time was two steps removed from the productive
activity on the assembly line and is therefore not "integral and
indispensable" to a "principal activity."
78
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INTRODUCTION
Assume a faculty member at a public college is
reprimanded by her department chair for the following reasons:
she is told that her explanations to her students are unclear. In
a recent class she taught, she gave 13 incompletes. When
students approach her about making up the incomplete, she
does not explain how to successfully complete the course. The
students complain to her chair and she is given a reprimand and
eventually not re-hired.
The faculty member sues the college. She alleges
infringement of her rights to free speech and academic freedom
"in retaliation for her refusal to comply with a request that she
communicate more clearly to her students what was required to
complete the coursework in a class she taught in the fall of
2000." 1

*Professor, Legal Studies, Ithaca College, School of Business
**Associate Professor of Finance, Ithaca College, School of
Business
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Is this the sort of issue that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they approved the Bill of Rights? Faculty
members often assert that they "have First Amendment rights"
yet few agree on exactly what those rights are. While there is a
consistently held belief that discussions in the classroom are
protected, do those rights encompass the "right not to explain
class material;" or the "right to have personal discussions"?
And what of the students' rights? Does the First Amendment
mean that students can "say anything they want" in the name of
academic freedom? And do faculty have a right to remove a
student from a classroom if they find the students' speech
disturbing or upsetting?
The purpose of this paper is to examine issues of free
speech as they apply in the classroom. It will examine these
issues both as they pertain to statements by faculty in the
classroom, for which they receive some form of "punishment"
as well as statements or actions by students.
PART I. FACULTY FREE SPEECH AT PUBLIC
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

Historically, courts have held that at a public college or
university, "faculty may not be terminated for the content of
their classroom speech, so long as it is consistent with the
purpose of the course."2 The rationale is that an institution
cannot limit a public faculty member's right to speech, or
terminate a faculty appointment for speech expressed in the
context of the citizen role or about a public issue. " 3 Language,
however, is not protected if, "taken in context, it constitute[s] a
deliberate, superfluous attack on a 'captive audience' with no
academic purpose or justification." 4 The First Amendment
does not protect public college faculty in vulgar and profane
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speech where the words are not "germane to the subject
matter" or m violation of the college's sexual harassment
policy. 5
In the seminal case of Pickering v. Board of Education, 6
the Supreme Court ruled that school board officials in Will
County, Illinois, violated the First Amendment rights of a
public high school teacher when they fired him for writing a
letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the board
of education for its allocation of school funds between athletics
and education. The Court ruled that "[i]n determining a public
employee's rights of free speech, the problem is to arrive "at a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."7 "Whether
a public employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern," so as to protect an employee from termination for
expressing those views "must be determined by content, form
and the context of a given statement."8
There are deeply ingrained societal reasons for protecting
faculty speech. Justice Brennan noted in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 9 "Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of
ideas. '" 10 He warned how dangerous it would be to "impose
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges
and universities." 1 "The nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to the robust exchange of ideas
[rather]
which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
2
than through any kind of authoritative selection."'
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Free speech in the classroom is not unfettered. Like any
public employee, the courts analyzing the dismissal of
at public colleges and universities employ a four part test m
determining whether that dismissal is protected speech.
"The first step is to determine whether the speech
is protected, i.e., on a matter of public concern. If
so the second step is to balance the employee's
in;erest in commenting on matters of public
concern against the government employer's
interest in promoting efficient government
services. If that balance is struck in favor of the
employee's interest, the third step requires the
employee to demonstrate that his speech was a
substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. If the employee so
demonstrates, the fourth step considers whether
the government employer has proven that it
have taken the same adverse employment actiOn,
even in the absence of the protected speech. The
first two steps are legal questions which the court
resolves to determine whether the speech is
constitutionally protected. The second two steps
concern causation and involve questions of
13
fact."

Is the speech a matter ofpublic concern?
The courts differentiate between speech that is personal
in nature, and thus unprotected, versus
that is matter
of public concern and thus protected.
What
a
matter of public concern is generally related to a pohtlcal,
· concern," 15 as enunc1·ated
social or other matter of commumty
in Connick v. Meyers. 16 Here, the respondent, an Assistant
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District Attorney, was informed that she would be transferred
to a different section of the criminal court to prosecute cases.
She strongly opposed the transfer and distributed a
questionnaire around the District Attorney's office. She was
terminated for refusing to accept the transfer and told that the
distribution of the questionnaire was an act of insubordination.
The court found that this was not a matter of public concern.
"Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District
Attorney's office was not discharging its governmental
responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick
and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public,
would convey no information at all other than the fact that a
single employee is upset with the status quo. 17 The Court
recognized that an assistant district attorney's speech related to
official pressure to work on a campaign was a matter of public
concern because it was "a matter of interest to the community
upon which it is essential that public employees be able to
speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal." 18
Speech, however, that deals with 'individual personnel disputes
and grievances' and that would be of 'no relevance to the
public's evaluation of the performance of governmental
agencies' is generally not of'public concem' ." 19
Other protected speech can be characterized as that which
serves a purpose, such as speech which "discloses any evidence
of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of
[state] officials, in terms of content, clearly concerns matters of
public import " 20 in comparison to speech that is "calculated to
redress personal grievances." 21

Hulen v. Yatei 2 involved a dysfunctional accounting
department at Colorado State University (CSU). The
department was fraught with in-fighting and accusations of
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unethical behavior. The plaintiff "cooperated with other
members of the Accounting Department in seeking to revoke
the tenure of a colleague (Dr. William Mister) on grounds of
plagiarism and copyright violations, emotional abuse of
students abuse and harassment of staff, misuse of state funds,
'
.
receipt of kickbacks from a Eublisher in return for
textbooks, and other charges" 3. Hulen "attempted to bnng his
concerns to the CSU Administration. He wrote memos to the
provost about the lack of an investigation, and made statements
about unethical behavior that he perceived going on in the
department. 24 In one memorandum, he wrote, "Yet the very
cornerstone of our profession of accounting involves ethical
behavior and integrity. We cannot successfully teach ethics if
it is not practiced at CSU."25 The administration asked Dr.
Hulen to stop its investigation of Dr. Mister. When he refused,
Dr. Hulen was removed from the accounting department and
placed in the management department, in which
not
qualified to teach any courses, "thereby resultmg m. a
diminished ability to attract research funds, publish
scholarship, receive salary increases, teach summer tax classes,
and obtain reimbursement for professional dues and journal
,26
. .
subscnpt10ns.

tenure and promotion, and a letter making suggestions about
school policy and curriculum. The letters regarding the
professor's particular status for tenure and promotion were held
not to "relate in any way to any political, social or other matter
of community concern .... Moreover, many of these letters make
clear that plaintiff was writing merely as a disgruntled
employee complaining of a personal employment dispute. " 29

The court found that this was exactly the type of speech
worth protecting. "The speech in this case fairly relates to
charges at a public university that plainly would be of interest
to the public. "[T]eachers whose speech directly affects the
public's perception of the quality of education in a
academic system find their speech protected [under the First
Amendment]. " 27
Many times the action of the professor is mixed with
some protected and some non-protected activities. For
example, in Blum v. Schlege/, 28 a law school professor wrote
letters to his fellow faculty members relating to his quest for

In Hudson v Craven, 30 an economics professor at Clark
College encouraged her students, as part of a class assignment,
to attend the World Trade Organization (WTO)
meetings/protests in Seattle. These protests were highly
publicized in the area and attracted international attention.
When the college learned of her plans to take the students to a
potentially dangerous event, the college admonished her that
she could not do so. She sued, claiming that her First
Amendment rights were violated, but the court disagreed.
"While Hudson's freedom to participate in discussion about the
WTO surely implicates core political speech, the actual
curtailment of her First Amendment rights was minimal.
Hudson was free to attend the anti-WTO rally on her own. She
was free to communicate her views on the WTO to her students
or to anyone else. She was free to associate with her students in
the classroom on this matter. The only claimed abridgement of
her First Amendment rights was that she was not permitted,
under the de facto auspices of the College, to associate with a
handful of students during a discrete event for a limited
duration. " 31
This case is an excellent example of when the "legitimate
administrative interests of Clark College" strongly outweighed
the professor's associational interests. The court also espoused
language helpful in determining when faculty 's first
amendment rights can be legitimately curtailed. These include:
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(1)

(2)

(3)

risks to students, particularly an underage group,
and potential liability for the college, because of the
reports of potential for violence;
students who were not able to attend would not
have the benefit of access and networking with
teachers;
mixing one's politics with one's professional
responsibility in the classroom, which is a special
trust; [and] (4) marginal benefit from participating
32
in the demonstration.

The court found that, "This litany boils down to two
reasons: student safety and pedagogical oversight. While some
of these justifications are more significant than others, on
balance the legitimate interests of Clark College as an
employer and educational institution outweigh those of Hudson
33
to participate in the de facto field trip with her students."
Clark College met its burden by demonstrating that its
legitimate interests outweighed Hudson's interest in attending
the anti-WTO rally with her students.

Was the speech a substantial or motivating factor?
The plaintiffs second hurdle is proving that the speech
was a "substantial or motivating factor" in the employment
4
decision. In de Llano v. Berglund/ a faculty member criticized
numerous administrative decisions including rising salaries of
administrators and poor spending policies of administrators.
The plaintiff met the first requirement, that the issue be one of
public concern, but he failed to satisfy the second requirement.
He could not prove that his speech is what caused his
dismissal. The court stated that, "We are unable to ascertain
any evidence that he was terminated because of the letters he
wrote to the various venues. The dismissal notice given to de
Llano outlines a number of reasons for his termination and
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those reasons were substantiated in two separate hearings. Not
one of the reasons stated for his termination related to de
Llano's letters. The fact that de Llano publicly criticized
college administrators, and that some of the criticism is
constitutionally protected, is insufficient to carry his burden of
establishing that the letters were a substantial factor in the
termination decision."35 The unfortunate reality of this case is
that the review boards or administrators hearing these types of
complaints can choose their words carefully. By not stating that
any of the reasons for dismissal are due to the exercise of
speech, the plaintiff will have a difficult time prevailing on the
issue of causation.
Since the Pickering decision, the Supreme Court has
significantly modified its analysis of first amendment rights of
civil or public employees which are applicable, therefore, to
faculty employed at public institutions.
In Waters v.
Churchill, 36 the plaintiff, a nurse, complained to others in the
hospital about co-workers as well as the running of the
hospital. Ultimately, she was fired and she sued claiming her
speech was both protected and non-disruptive. Here, the court
stated that the right to speak is also limited if it may cause
disruption, not if it actually did. "Whittled to its core, Waters
permits a government employer to fire an employee for
speaking on a matter of public concern if: (1) the employer's
prediction of disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential
disruptiveness is enough to outweigh the value of the speech;
and (3) the employer took action against the employee based
on this disruption and not in retaliation for the speech. 37 In
addition, when weighing the value of the employee's speech
against the interference with government operations, the
Waters plurality also indicated that a government employer
need only show that the speech is likely to be disruptive before
38
the speaker may be punished.
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.
In Jeffries v. Harleston 39 one ofthe fiew cases to mterpret
Waters, the plaintiff, was the chairman of the Black Studies
department at CUNY. In delivering a speech he made
derogatory statements about the public school curriculum, Jews
and the history of black oppression. As a result, the CUNY
Board of Trustees voted to reduce his chairmanship from three
to one year. Jeffries sued, claiming that his demotion was based
on the speech, and thus protected.

The appellant argued that his language was not obscene,
and that he had been exercising his First Amendment right to
use profane language. Furthermore, he argued that his First
Amendment right to "academic freedom" permitted such
language. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision that a publicly employed college teacher is not
constitutionally protected in the offensive use of profanity in
the classroom. In fact, the court found that professors hold a
unique position. "We view the role of higher education as no
less pivotal to our national interest. It carries on the process of
instilling in our citizens necessary democratic virtues, among
which are civility and moderation. It is necessary to the nurture
of knowledge and resourcefulness that undergird our economic
and political system. Repeated failure by a member of the
educational staff of Midland College to exhibit professionalism
degrades his important mission and detracts from the subjects
he is trying to teach. '.4 2

But the court, applying the criteria set forth in Waters,
disagreed. The court held that the defendants did not violate
Jeffries' free speech rights if: (1) it was reasonable for them to
believe that the Albany speech would disrupt CUNY
operations; (2) the potential interference with CUNY
operations outweighed the First Amendment value of the
Albany speech; and (3) they demoted Jeffries because they
feared the ramifications for CUNY, or, at least, for reasons
wholly unrelated to the Albany speech. 40 Because there was a
potential for disruption, the court found, that, as a matter of
law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh
whatever First Amendment value the Albany speech might
have had.
There is also a clear line of cases involving faculty
members engaged in inappropriate language and/or behavior as
unprotected activity. For example, suppose that a professor
uses profanity in the classroom. In spite of warnings from the
dean, the instructor continued to make derogatory statements
towards his students about their attitude in his class, some of
which included the words "hell," "damn," "bullshit," and
"sucks."41 After two students filed written complaints
concerning the professor' s speech, the dean initiated action,
approved by the board of trustees, to terminate the appellant.

Furthermore, "there was no doubt that the appellant's
outbursts did not address a matter of public concem." 43 As
previously stated, the indecent language appellant used
described his attitude toward his students, "hardly a matter
that .... would occasion public discussion." The Court ruled that
the "appellant has not argued that his profanity was for any
purpose other than cussing out his students as an expression of
frustration with their progress- to 'motivate' them- and has
thereby impliedly conceded his case under Connick. ' .44
In Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 45 the plaintiff was suspended for
his use of vulgar and profane language in his literature class.
He filed a suit against the president of Macomb Community
College alleging, among other things, that his freedom of
speech was violated. College officials met with the plaintiff
who defended his use of the language by stating that it was
used to highlight the "'chauvinistic degrading attitudes in
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society that depict women as sexual objects, as compared to
certain words to describe male genitalia, which are not taboo or
46
considered to be deliberately intended to degrade. ' " After the
meeting, the College gave the plaintiff a written warning that
stated in part:

had given a lecture about language and social constructivism in
order to show students the way in which language is used to
marginalize minorities and other oppressed groups of society.52
The students were then engaged in a classroom discussion
analyzing the effect of oppressive and demeaning words such
as "n*****r" and "b***h." 53 Subsequently, one of the
instructor's African-American students complained to her
minister, a local civil-rights activist, who, in tum threatened the
school with a decline in African-American enrollment if the
dispute was not resolved in the student' s favor. The President
and Dean obliged, and the instructor's teaching contract was
not renewed.

Unless germane to discussion of appropriate
course materials and thus a constitutionally
protect act of academic freedom, your utterance
in the classroom of such words as 'f**k,' 'c**t'
and 'p***y' may serve as a reasonable basis for
concluding as a matter of law that you are
fostering a learning environment hostile to
women."47
After subsequent complaints of vulgar and profane
language in class, the College reprimanded and then suspended
the plaintiff for a period of time. The Court concluded that the
plaintiff had no constitutionally protected right to use vulgar
and profane language in his English composition class because
48
it was "not germane to the subject matter." The court stated
that "Plaintiff may have a constitutional right to use words such
as "p***y," "c**t," and "f**k," but he does not have a
constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where
they are not germane to the subject matter, in contravention of
49
the College's sexual harassment policy." The Court remarked
that, "[w]hile a professor's right to academic freedom and
freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting,
they are not absolute to the point of compromising a student's
50
right to learn in a hostile-free environment."
In a subsequent case, the plaintiffs gratuitous use of inclass vulgarity was distinguished from speech that, while
offensive to some , was germane to the course
material and
51
therefore protected by the First Amendment. The instructor

The court held that the use of "socially controversial
words," along with "racial and gender epithets in an academic
context designed to analyze the impact of these words upon
societal relations, touched upon a matter of public concern and
thus fell within the First Amendment's protection." 54
Furthermore, the court ruled that "speech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, and is entitled to special protection." 55 In addition, the
teacher's actions did not have an impact on the governance or
operation of the school, thus satisfying the balancing tests other
prong.
What about a faculty member who makes off color jokes;
uses sexual innuendo around students and makes comments
such as "he wanted to "get his hands" on one graduate student
and "get naked" or "drink some good beer" with another?
These statements by a non-tenured probationary faculty
member were held to be in the faculty member's personal
interest. "The statements were simply parts of a calculated type
of speech designed to further Trejo's private interests in
attempting to solicit female companionship and, at the same
time, possibly to irritate the other graduate students to whom
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he was speaking." 56
As such they were completely
unprotected by the First Amendment and the actions taken
against him by the administration were upheld.

discriminated against because of his national origin, physical
disability, and protest against the classroom rule prohibiting
first-year dental students from sitting in the last row of certain
classes." 62

PART II. STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.
The rights of students in the classroom was enunciated in
the seminal case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist. 57 Set during the political turmoil of the 1960's,
Tinker involved high school students suspended from school
for wearing black arm bands. The court set out a balancing test
to be employed in instances when First Amendment rights
clash with the need to maintain order in schools. In the now
famous pronouncement, the court stated, "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for
almost 50 years."58
On the other hand, it is equally important for schools to
maintain order in the schools if for no other reason than the
safety of the students. Therefore, the courts also acknowledge
the need to allow schools "to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools." 59
A classic example of the court's reasoning is evidenced in
Salehpour v. University of Tennessee 60 Here, a dental student
refused to follow the professor's classroom rule 'barring firstyear dental students from sitting in the last row of their
classrooms. ' On one particular day, the professor asked the
student to move in the presence of a guest lecturer. "Plaintiff
replied that he was comfortable where he was sitting and did
not wish to move. Dr. Fletcher informed Plaintiff that if he did
61
not move to another seat, he would have to leave the class."
The lawsuit that ensued included allegations "that he was

Citing Tinker, the court noted that, "conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason--whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior--materially disrupts
class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." As such, we
find that, here, Plaintiffs claim fails at the inception where his
alleged speech, i.e., his conduct of disrupting the classroom
milieu for the sole purpose of advancing and pursuing his
admitted "power struggle" with the University, was not
protected activity. 63
It is interesting to note that few cases exist that examine
the tension between faculty and students in the classroom. In
Brown v. Li, 64however, the court acknowledged that neither
the courts or the parties had found any Supreme Court case
discussing the appropriate standard for reviewing a university's
regulation of students' curricular speech
As a general rule, however, the court found that United
States Supreme Court sentiment that "the curriculum of a
public educational institution is one means by which the
institution itself expresses its policy, a policy with which others
do not have a constitutional right to interfere."65 Therefore,
when the student submitted his thesis and attached to it a
"Disacknowledgment" which began "I would like to offer
special F*** You's to the following degenerates for being an
ever-present hindrance during my graduate career····" It then
identified the Dean and staff of the graduate school, the
managers of Davidson Library, former California Governor
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Wilson, the Regents of the University of California, and
"Science" as having been particularly obstructive to Plaintiffs
progress toward his graduate degree. The dean then wrote a
letter to Plaintiff, informing him that his degree would be
conferred upon the approval of his thesis. The letter further
noted that approval would be forthcoming as soon as Plaintiff
66
removed his "Disacknowledgements."

student in the University of Utah's actor training program and a
devout Mormon argued that making her say the "F" word as
part of a script violated her religious beliefs. As a result, she
dropped out of the program and then sued for deprivation of
her civil rights.

The court found that no First Amendment violation
existed but rather this was a clear pedagogical decision by the
university and the university set the standard.
. . . Plaintiffs thesis was subject to a reviewing
committee's reasonable regulation. Plaintiff was
given reasonable standards for that assignment,
including
a
pedagogically
appropriate
requirement that the thesis comply with
professional standards governing his discipline.
He was instructed that he should consult a
standard style manual, or talk with members of
his
committee,
about
those
requirements ... Plaintiffs committee members
acted well within their discretion, and in
conformity with the First Amendment, when they
declined to approve the noncompliant section.
Their decision was reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical objective: teaching
Plaintiff the proper format for a scientific paper.

Nevertheless, the court wondered if the use of such
language was in fact a pretext to discriminate against her on the
basis of religion, or an 'anti- Mormon sentiment.' "Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to Axson-Flynn, we find that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendants' justification for the script adherence requirement
was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious
discrimination"69 thereby reversing and remanding the decision
for further deliberation.

CONCLUSION

With few cases to rely upon to answer questions
regarding classroom behavior at the college and university
level, this case contains especially helpful language.
first amendment rights are
What if the
by an in-classroom act1v1ty? In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson

The court found that as long as there was a relationship
between the pedagogy and the goals of the course, then the
language was justified. "The school's methodology may not be
necessary to the achievement of its goals and it may not even
be the most effective means of teaching, but it can still be
"reasonably related" to pedagogical concerns. A more stringent
standard would effectively give each student veto power over
curricular requirements, subjecting the curricular decisions of
teachers to the whims of what a particular student does or does
not feel like learning on a given day. This we decline to do."68

a

The foregoing review of the case law on faculty and
student first amendment rights in the classroom provides some
comforting safe havens and guidelines, but it also indicates a
disconcerting undercurrent of subjectivity that may undermine
free speech in academia. It seems reasonable that both faculty
and students have no right to engage in gratuitous profanity in
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the classroom, that a modicum of decorum should be
maintained. Nor should faculty require students to participate
in potentially dangerous demonstrations in furtherance of their
own political viewpoints. But some faculty, particularly those
not tenured, may abridge their speech for fear of reprisals.
After Hudson, would a professor be at risk is she encouraged
her students to become informed citizens and to engage in
participatory democracy by checking out the campus sit-in?
And after Bonnell, should speech, media, language, and
English professors refrain from the study of inflammatory
Literature for fear that some may take offense? Perhaps most
disturbing is the courts willingness in Axson-Flynn to allow a
jury to review a script to determine if the use of a swear word
was actually a pretext for religious discrimination. If the
university is to remain Justice Brennan's ideal "marketplace of
ideas", it cannot be pre-sanitized.
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THEY EAT HORSES, DON'T THEY?
THE AMERICAN HORSE SLAUGHTER PREVENTION
ACT
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"The measure ofa society is how well it treats its animals. " 1
Barbara Righton
I. INTRODUCTION

Congress has historically exhibited a significant interest
in the welfare of the nation's horses. The recent debate over
attempts to end the slaughtering of horses in the United States
that are exported for consumption to Europe and Japan has
ended at least temporarily, in a modem coup d ' e'tat pitting
Congress and numerous animal welfare groups, against the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDAl The losers
unfortunately, in this ongoing battle of wills are the 80,000
horses slated for slaughter at three U.S. slaughterhouses which
continue in operation despite the clear intent of Congress.
II. BACKGROUND

The horse has a long and intimate history with mankind
in general and in particular with the development of the
Americas. The Western Hemisphere had not seen horses since
the end of the Ice Age (circa 10,000 B.C.). Christopher
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Central Connecticut State
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